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Abstract
Using a sample of 495 Latin American banks over the period 2001-2008,
this paper investigates how bank concentration inuences cost and prot
eciency. We calculate scale eciency to assess whether these banks are
close to their optimal size. We nd that banks are more inecient in prots
than in costs; concentration impairs cost eciency; larger banks have higher
performance, but this advantage decreases in concentrated markets; private
and foreign banks are the most ecient; most banks are operating under
increasing returns of scale, which contributes to the discussion on Basel III.
Key Words: Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Eciency, Latin America,
Market Structure, Basel III.





Due to its economic relevance, the literature has become very concerned in
discussing about competitiveness, stability and eciency of banking markets
(Shaeck et al., 2009; Hasan et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2009). Since the 1990s,
Latin American banks are facing a process of deregulation and consolidation.
Therefore, important to determine how these changes are aecting eciency
in dierent banking markets in the region and to evaluate which variables
better explain this eciency, as well. Another motivation is the recent -
nancial crisis that has boosted the signicance in discussing bank market
structure and optimal scale. This paper addresses to these concerns of the
literature by estimating banking cost, prot and scale eciency from banks
of 17 Latin American countries in the period 2001-2008, and then measuring
the impact of banking market concentration, among other factors, on the
quality of bank management.
With the purpose of measuring bank cost and prot eciency for Latin
America, we employ the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) by Aigner et al.
(1977) to estimate a common cost (prot) frontier for the whole region. The
idea of the SFA is that it measures how distant a bank is from the minimum
cost (maximum prot) in the sample, i.e. from the best practice bank. As
in previous studies, we include country-specic variables in the cost (prot)
translog specication to assess for cross-country dierences in the banking
sector (see Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) and Bonin et al. (2005a)). Ac-
cording to Bos and Kool (2006), prot and cost eciencies should be equal
in a perfect competitive market. Deviations in these scores may suggest a
non-competitive environment in the banking market in question. Our results
support this idea by pointing out that Latin American are indeed banks more
inecient in the revenue side.
Moreover, we investigate the eect of market concentration, and other
bank-specic variables, on eciency by employing the Battese and Coelli
(1995) model. This method avoids the bias of estimating the frontier and
the correlates in two steps (Wang and Schmidt, 2002) by estimating both in
only one-step. As proxy of concentration, we propose to use an improvement
of the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), known as the HHI dual (employed
by Chang et al., 2006). We use both assets and loans concentration HHI dual
measures. It is of the bank regulators interest to know the implications of
concentration on eciency in order to opt for the regulation policy to im-
prove performance of the nancial sector as a whole. If the results show a
positive relationship between these two variables, regulators should provide
incentives for bank mergers and acquisitions. While the literature on bank-
ing eciency is vast, few studies have actually analyzed this relationship,
4specially in developing countries, such as Latin America. We propose to
contribute to literature by evaluating this eect.
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997), the common wisdom states
that mergers and acquisitions have been successful in improving cost and
prot eciency, although there was not much empirical proof of this at that
time1. Berger and Hannan (1998) nd a negative relationship between con-
centration and cost eciency. They suggest that concentrated markets leads
to collusion (an idea known as the SCP paradigm) and result in lower eorts
of banks to maximize prots and minimize costs, resulting in ineciencies
(i.e. Hicks' quiet life hypothesis). On the other hand, Maudos and Guevara
(2007) not only reject the quiet life hypothesis for the EU-15 countries over
1993-2002, but also show that the market concentration and market power
have dierent impacts on cost eciency2. Both Chang et al. (2006) and Beck
et al. (2006) show that banking market concentration implicates lower nan-
cial fragility, measured by bank insolvency risk, for the Brazilian banking
market and 69 dierent countries, respectively.
Still in the Battese and Coelli specication, we add dummies of dierent
bank ownership (state-owned, private and foreign) to check if banking e-
ciency depends on the type of bank ownership. Regarding this matter, the
literature has found that on developed countries foreign banks are usually
less ecient than national banks, while on developing and transition coun-
tries foreign ownership seems to improve eciency of banks (Bonin et al.,
2005b; Berger et al., 2009; Bonin et al., 2005a; Hasan and Marton, 2003;
Staikouras et al., 2008; Fries and Taci, 2005; Tecles and Tabak, 2010). How-
ever, analyzing banks from Latin America, Figueira et al. (2009) nds that,
in 2001, performance of foreign and domestic banks were very similar, which
casts some doubts in this common sense in developing economies.
1The literature regarding bank M&A has found that performance improvement was
not the main motivator of the consolidation trend in the 80s and 90s (DeYoung et al.,
2009). Therefore, studies have focused in various managerial motives for M&A, such as
the maximization of CEO remuneration, the preference of lower competitive pressures, or
to be viewed by the government as a Too-Big-Too-Fail bank and exploit subsidies due to
this fact. Only after 2000, has the literature given more support to the view that M&A
are eciency improving.
2There is a growing concern in investigating if the common idea that concentrated
markets leads to a less competitive market (known as the SCP paradigm), is in fact true.
Several studies dismiss this paradigm, such as: Claessens and Laeven (2004) that nd a
positive relation between concentration and competition; Shaer and DiSalvo (1994) that
nd a high degree of banking competition in a small Pennsylvania county, even though
the market structure was a duopoly. On the other hand, Bikker and Haaf (2002) and
Deltuvaite et al. (2007), regress competition indicators on market concentration and they
do nd a negative relationship, supporting the SCP paradigm.
5Another topic we discuss to elucidate is how close are Latin American
banks from their optimum size. The method consists in estimating scale
eciency scores from the translog cost function. This analysis has gained
extreme relevance due to recent development of a Basel III accord. One aim
of this regulation is to impose higher restrictions to larger banks, which is
a measure defended by many specialists in the post crisis scenario (Cukier-
man, 2011). Bank regulators agree that too-big-to-fail (TBTF) nancial
institutions are too costly to maintain (Brewer and Jagtiani, 2009), since the
protection by regulators may have generated a moral hazard problem, lead-
ing to excessive risk taking behavior and triggered the recent world nancial
crisis. In other words, banks had a strong incentive to become TBTF, since
regulators had rewarded them because of their relevant size, which reduces
their costs of maintaining this size. Supporting this view, Brewer and Jag-
tiani (2009) have found that American banks pay a monetary amount to
become large (more than U$ 100 billion of assets).
Consequently, we propose to evaluate what would be the probable impact
of the upcoming Basel III regulation on Latin American banks. This is a
relevant contribution to literature, because this paper may show whether
the nancial sector of a region composed of developing economies also need
the same regulation of those of developed countries, where the crisis has
originally taken place. Should there be a large proportion of banks under
diseconomies of scale whose size is not decreasing over the years, Basel III is
indeed needed in order to increase eciency in the regional nancial sector.
However, if the majority of Latin American banks are under economies of
scale, there are still gains to be obtained from an increase in banks size from
a microeconomic perspective. Furthermore, even medium size banks may
impose threats to the banking system and their eventual failure may have a
strong eect on the banking system3.
We structure our paper as follows: in Section 2, we describe our method-
ology, dening the variables of interest and the regression approaches taken;
in Section 3, we present and summarize the data sources; we demonstrate
and discuss the empirical results in Section 4, and nally in Section 5 we
make our the nal remarks regarding the outcome of this paper.
3Although we evaluate only the bank eciency side in this aspect, there is also an
income distribution issue to consider. Beck et al. (2010) analyzes whether the process
of bank consolidation has resulted in any improvements in the US income distribution.
The authors nd that the removal of these restrictions has improved the competitive
environment, and also increased the income of those with lower incomes. Therefore, the
expansion of large banks due to deregulation has indeed improved social conditions in the
US, through the channel of an increase in bank performance.
62 Methodology
In this section, we specify the method as well as the variables to estimate
bank eciency for Latin America. We employ the Stochastic Frontier Anal-
ysis by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) to
estimate a common frontier for all Latin American countries. It consists in
the estimation of cost (prot) frontier by regressing a translog cost (prot)
function, and decomposing the errors into two parts. One captures the ran-
dom disturbances (), assumed to be normally distributed, and representing
measurement errors and other uncontrollable factors. The other error term
() captures technical and allocative ineciency, both under managerial con-
trol, and it is assumed to be half-normally distributed4. According to the
literature, the estimation of a single frontier for the whole region allows banks
from dierent countries to be compared against the same benchmark (Berger
and Humphrey, 1997; Lensink et al., 2008). More specically, we employ the
Battese and Coelli (1995) SFA model, which estimates simultaneously the
eciency degree and the coecients of the exogenous variables (one-step
model). The Battese and Coelli (1995) specication avoids the bias of a two-
step approach that considers the eciency to be half-normally distributed in
the rst step, while in the second step one considers it as normally distributed
and dependent of the explanatory variables.
The degree of eciency represents how close a bank is to the minimum
cost or the maximum prot, i.e. the stochastic frontiers. Cost ineciency
measures how much costs are raised above the frontier, while prot ine-
ciency reduces the prot in relation to the frontier give the output levels.
In the literature, the best performance bank in the sample determines the
maximum prots and minimum costs, and all the other bank's ineciency
levels are computed in relation to them.
As in Berger and Mester (1997), we employ an alternative prot function
over the standard prot specication, by using output quantities rather than
output prices in order to assess for bank market power over output prices5.
4Both SFA and the data envelopment analysis (DEA) have been widely used by the
literature. The SFA has the advantage of dividing error into two components, while the
DEA considers that all deviation is due to ineciency, dismissing the eect of random
errors, (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007b). However, the SFA has to assume a distribution
to rm-specic technical eciency related variables (Hasan and Marton, 2003).
5Among other advantages of employing the alternative prot specication, Berger and
Mester (1997) state that this model provides a way of take into consideration the dierences
in output qualities. Since the prot function is equal to the cost specication, with the
exception of the dependent variable, the former specication does not penalize banks from
providing high quality services, while the latter might. Additionally, output quantities
have a higher variability across banks than its prices and, thus, can better explain the
7In order to estimate cost (prot) eciency, we must rst specify, for example,
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where i and t refer to banks and time, respectively; C stands for the bank's
total cost; y represents four outputs: total loans, total deposits, other earning
assets, and non-interest income, which is a measure of bank non-traditional
activity6; w consists in two input prices: interest expenses to total deposits,
non-interest expenses to total assets7. The objective of normalizing the de-
pendent variable and one input price (w1) by another input price (w2) is to
ensure linear homogeneity. We also include a time trend T and its quadratic
term T 2 as in Lensink et al. (2008) and Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010),
since the translog function is a second order approximation.
Finally, in our estimation of one Latin American frontier, we employ coun-
try environment variables in order to control for cross-country heterogeneity
of banking markets. The use of macroeconomic variables in the translog
functions has been considered very important by the literature in the correct
estimation of cross-country eciency scores (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000;
Carvallo and Kasman, 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005). These variables reect
specic characteristics, such as geography, economic condition and nancial
dynamism. We employ, therefore, the following macroeconomic variables.
The density of population, measured by the ratio of inhabitants per square
kilometers. We believe that banks operating in a region with a high density
of population will have lower expenses. The density of demand stands for
variation in the dependent variable, before-tax prots (DeYoung and Hasan, 1998).
6Even though there is not a consensus on the matter yet, the literature has given an
increasing importance in incorporating variables of bank non-traditional activities (such as
o-balance sheet and non-interest income) in the analysis of bank eciency (Lozano-Vivas
and Pasiouras, 2010). Ignoring these measures can be misleading, since it does not take
into account the bank's balance sheet as a whole. Due to a high number of missing values
on Latin American banks' o-balance sheet, we only employ the non-interest income as a
non-traditional output. These authors nd that the introduction of non-interest income in
the translog increases both cost and prot eciency in relation to the traditional model,
without account for non-traditional activities.
7Total assets is employed instead of xed assets due to several missing data of the
latter.
8the ratio of total deposits to square kilometers. Banks with low density of
demand may have higher expenses. We employ the GDP per capita to as-
sess for the general development of the economy. The purpose of employing
the ratio of equity to assets is to control for the regulatory conditions. The
ratio of loans to deposits measures how much of the deposits are converted
into loan, i.e. the size of intermediation. Finally, we also use the real GDP
growth, as a proxy of economic dynamics.
We use a similar approach to the translog prot function, but instead of
total costs, the dependent variable is before-tax prots8 and the composed
error term is it   it. There is, however, a problem in applying the natural
logarithm of prots, since this variable can take negative values as well. In
order to solve this problem most of the studies so far had added a constant
in the prot model, equal to one plus the minimum value of prot. We nd
this approach to be equivocated, and thus employ an additional independent
variable - the Negative Prot Indicator (NPI) - that takes the value of 1 for
observations where prot  0 and it is equal to the absolute value of prot,
when prot < 0. We also change the dependent variable to take the value
of 1, when it is negative (see Bos and Koetter (2009) for more information).
Hasan et al. (2009) also use this method in the estimation of prot eciency
for 11 European Union countries between 1996 and 2004.
In the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, we estimate the eciency cor-
relates at the same time as the frontiers estimation. This means that the
ineciency term  for both the cost and prot functions can be specied as
follows:




where z is a vector of n bank-specic variables that explains eciency of
bank i at time t. We use the maximum likelihood to estimate cost (prot)
translog function and equation (2) simultaneously.
We explain the variables that compose z next. First, we include the
equity ratio, measured as the ratio of equity and total assets, in order to
assess for the inuence on shareholders capital on the ability of banks to
optimize both costs and prots. The natural logarithm of total assets, as
a proxy of bank's size (SIZE). The ratio of total loan loss provisions to
total loans (LLP) is a proxy of bank risks. It is rational to suggest that
banks that become vulnerable to riskier assets have lower eciency, due to
8The use of prots before tax is consistent with previous studies. Using after-tax prots
would result in wrong inference about bank eciency in countries with dierent tributary
systems.
9higher expected losses. We also use the return on assets (ROA) in the cost
translog function as proxy of protability, and due to a probable endogeneity
problem we do not employ this variable in the prot eciency estimation.
Both translog functions also contain ownership dummies.
As to determine whether bank concentration has any eect on cost and
prot eciency and the direction of this inuence, we employ, as a eciency
correlate, an improvement of the traditional HHI, the HHI dual (HHID), as
a measure of market concentration. Tabak et al. (2009) and Chang et al.
(2006) have already utilized this measure in empirical investigations regard-
ing banking market structure. The idea of the dual is to associate a series Y
to another series X, which represents the original market, and to its HHI. We
call the former series the HHI-dual of X, constructed according the following
assumptions:
(a)Y has the same number of observations as the original series, with m





i=1 yi, i.e. total amount of X is equivalent to the total
amount of Y .
(c) HHIY = HHIX, i.e. the concentration measure remains invariant in
the process (known as the appearance maintainer principle).
Y represents, therefore, a ctional banking market that preserves some
properties of the original banking structure, but is stratied into two groups:
one, composed of m banks that hold total, and equally shared, participation
of the market, and the second, composed of n   k banks, who holds zero
participation in the market. Due to condition (c) above, X has the same
HHI as Y, the original series. However, it is much more easier to understand
the market concentration of X by considering the concentration of Y . We
then dene the dual as d = 1 m=n, i.e. the proportion of banks that do not
have any participation in the market. One can easily prove that m = 1
HHI,
and thus we calculate the dual as:
d = HHI




where n is the number of banks and HHI is the traditional HHI measured as




dual varies from 0 (minimum value) to 1   1
n (maximum value), and as the
traditional HHI, it is monotonic on concentration.
We can summarize the other advantages of the dual as follows: the dual
is still a concentration index, but normalized and undimensional; dierent
concentration measures can be compared by the calculation of their duals;
10concentration between countries and years can be also compared, since the
dual does not depend on the number of individuals/groups in the series.
In fact, this last observation is important when dealing with cross-country
comparisons of market structure. A non-normalized concentration index can
severely bias the results of estimations that employ these measures, since
they depend on the amount of banks that operates in each country and in
each time period. Note that, asymptotically, the maximum value of the dual
tends to 1, but to avoid any bias in the estimation resulting of a small number
of banks in a specic banking market, we employ the normalized dual (or
HHID = HHID=(1   1=n)) to always guarantee that 0 < HHID < 1.
To test the hypothesis that market concentration inuences bank man-
agement, we employ four dierent specications:
(a) The HHID in term of assets;
(b) The HHID in term of loans;
(c) The HHID in term of assets plus an interaction between this HHID
and SIZE;
(d) The HHID in term of loans plus an interaction between this HHID
and SIZE.
This results, therefore, in four dierent estimated cost and prot frontiers.
The objective of including the interaction between HHID and SIZE is
that it is reasonable to suppose that the eect of banking market concentra-
tion on performance depends on bank's size. If we nd that this interaction
is positively related to eciency, the recent trends of consolidation may be
explained by banks willing to become larger in order to distance themselves
from the competitors, increasing market concentration. A negative rela-
tionship suggests that banks are aiming to match their size with the other
competitors, decreasing market concentration.
From the translog cost function, we also calculate the scale eciency








where j refers the outputs in the translog specication. In this case, if
SE < 1, then we have increasing returns of scale (economies of scale), since,
supposing X > Y , an increase in X% in total outputs will increase costs in
Y%. On the other hand, if SE > 1, decreasing returns of scale is the case
11(diseconomies of scale), i.e. an increase in total outputs will increase even
more total costs.
3 Data
Our sample consists in an unbalanced annual panel data of 495 Latin Amer-
ican banks over the period from 2001 to 2008, totalizing 2927 observations.
Thus, our sample is very representative and rich in data for the empirical es-
timation. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the
translog specications. Instead of the natural logarithm of these variables,
we present them in levels in order to be more informative.
Place Tables 1 and 2 about Here
We have extracted the necessary bank-specic data for the model from
Latin American central banks, with variables measured in US dollars, which
guarantees accounting uniformity between dierent countries. Initially, our
base consisted in the population of four bank specializations: commercial,
cooperative, real-state, specialized government institutions. After excluding
banks/periods with missing, negative or zero values for inputs and outputs
and other relevant data, we were left with a sample of 495 banks operating in
17 countries. In fact, table 2 shows the number of banks by year and country
in the nal database.
We also present the yearly average values of the HHI dual of assets and
loans by country in tables 3 and 4, respectively 9. We calculate these in-
dices using the initial data, before excluding banks for missing data on some
variables.
Place Tables 3 and 4 about Here
The interpretation of the values of the dual is that, for Argentina in 2001,
bank concentration in term of assets (table 3) was equivalent to the market
concentration of a banking industry, where 79.18% of the banks did not have
any assets, and all assets were concentrated in the hands of 20.82% of the
banks. In 2002 for the same country, concentration has increased, since now
9We have calculated the dual of the HHIs using the available data from central banks.
12one can say that concentration is equal to a situation where 83.11% of the
banks possess zero assets.
By looking only at the scores of the HHID in terms of loans and assets,
one may say that Brazil and Argentina have the most concentrated banking
markets in the region, while Bolivia, Paraguay and Nicaragua are among
those with the most diversied banking markets. This comparison wouldn't
be possible by comparing traditional HHIs, since their values would depend
on the number of banks in each country. There is also evidence that the
banking sector of most Latin American countries are becoming more concen-
trated. This conrms that the region has been facing a process of banking
consolidation. Sometimes, however, each type of HHI give dierent results
for the concentration as well. Argentinean banks, for example, presents an
increasing concentration in assets, while in loans, there appears to be a de-
creasing trend. For Paraguay, the opposite occurs.
Place Table 5 about Here
Finally, table 5 presents the means and standard deviations of the country-
environment variables. The translog specication includes these variables
that represent economic and nancial sector development indicators in order
to access for cross-country dierences in economic and nancial conditions.
These macroeconomic data were taken from the IMF's World Economic Out-
look, World Bank's database, and Latin American central banks10. In fact, in
Latin America, there are some essential economic dierences between coun-
tries. While there are some with a dynamic economy and satisfactory social




We estimate cost and prot eciency scores for each bank from 17 dierent
Latin American countries in the sample based in a common frontier. We
employ the Battese and Coelli (1995) SFA model that estimates simultane-
ously eciency scores and the exogenous variables that are supposed to ex-
plain eciency (as in equation 2). We also employ country-specic variables
10Bank's deposits, loans, assets and equity by country have been aggregated using the
original database from the central banks to proxy for total nancial sector's deposits,
loans, assets and equity.
13and, as an additional output, a measure of bank non-traditional activity in
both translog functions. The rst is to control for the existing heterogeneity
between banking markets making cross-country comparisons are more con-
sistent. The latter is to consider the participation of bank non-traditional
activities on its total income, which has been increasing in the last years.
Since we use four dierent specications of the correlates of eciency for
each translog function, table 6 presents the intervals of the mean estimated
scores of cost and prot eciency.
Place Table 6 about Here
Latin American banks are found to be, on average, 91.8% cost ecient
and from 50.6% to 52.5% prot ecient. These values are in line with the
literature in the sense that banks appear to manage their costs better than
their prots. Other articles have found similar eciency scores for Latin
America as ours (e.g Pasiouras et al., 2009; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras,
2010). An interesting fact is that the standard deviation of prot eciency
is equal to 22 p.p., pointing out that Latin America bank performance on
the revenue size is particularly dispersed11, while cost eciency is much more
centered over its mean value.
These results support the necessity to consider the revenue side as well,
when evaluating banking eciency. Prot ecient banks seem to be also
cost ecient, but the inverse does not necessarily hold (Maudos et al., 2002;
Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007b). An exception to that rule was found by
Srari (2009), who has concluded that banks from countries of the Gulf coop-
eration council (GCC) are more eciency in prots than in costs. Bos and
Kool (2006) state that in a perfect competitive market, prot ecient banks
are also cost ecient. However, in an imperfect competitive market this is not
the case, since, for example, prot ecient banks may be inecient in terms
of costs or vice-versa. Apparently, our ndings suggest that Latin American
banks are under imperfect competition. There could be many other reasons
why Latin American banks are operating with such ineciency. We raise
the hypothesis that factors related to the political and economic instability
of the region may be dampening the banks management of costs and prots.
11Berger and Mester (1997) also nds this high standard deviation for several eciency
estimation techniques for a sample of 6000 US banks over the period of 1990-1995. Prots
are considered to be more variable, since they may depend on several simultaneous factors.
Besides the quality of management, unpredictable events, i.e. luck, can give banks large
prots or, in contrast, they can make banks incur in high losses.
14Regarding the evolution of eciency throughout the years, one may see
that cost eciency scores remained somewhat stable being approximately
equal to 92.2% in 2001 and 92.4% in 2008, even though between 2002 and
2007 scores appear to be slightly lower. This means that bank's ability to
manage their costs have not changed considerably in these years. On the
revenue side, however, management appear to have been improved. There
is a clear increasing trend of prot eciency from 2001 to 2007. In 2008,
an interesting nding is that prot eciency decreased in relation to the
last year, possibly due to the world nancial crisis. We can speculate that,
because of this crisis, banks preferred to increase their management of costs
and reduced their activities, which can be reected by the decrease of revenue
eciency.
Place Table 7 about Here
Cross-country comparisons in banking eciency scores are also important
to take into account. In table 7 the minimum and maximum result from the
four dierent translog specications. Cost eciency values are more homoge-
neous across countries than prot eciency. Banking sectors from Argentina,
Uruguay and Brazil are the least cost ecient, while Jamaica, Colombia
and Ecuador's are the most ecient. On the other hand, Chile, Nicaragua
and Venezuela have the highest prot eciency values, while Paraguay and
Uruguay, the lowest.
4.2 Eciency Correlates
In this section, we present the results of the regression of eciency scores
on several independent variables. Our main goal is to see whether market
concentration has any eect on both cost and prot eciency. We employ
the HHI dual in term of assets (HHID
A) and in term of loans (HHID
L ) as
proxies of market concentration. In addition, we interact the HHIs with the
size variable to evaluate how the size eect on eciency changes in higher
concentrated markets. Tables 8 and 9 show the Battese and Coelli (1995)
results of eciency explanatory variables for the translog cost and prot
functions, respectively.
Place Tables 8 and 9 about Here
15As can be seen in columns [1] and [2] of Table 8, the coecients of HHID
A
and of HHID
L are positive and signicant. Thus, market concentration ap-
pears to decrease overall cost eciency. Regarding the other control vari-
ables, we nd a positive coecient for equity ratio, which means that the
higher is the shareholders capital in relation to bank's assets, the less cost
ecient the bank is. This may be a sign that a higher shareholders' leverage
force banks to sacrice costs in exchange of achieving better results. Bank's
size presents a negative signicant coecient, meaning that the larger the
bank, the better it manages its cost. Finally, foreign and private banks
seems to be more ecient in costs than public banks, which is in line with
the literature on performance in banks from developing countries.
Columns [3] and [4] show the results when we add an interaction between
the HHI and the SIZE variable. The results for the other variables are similar
to the two rsts. In particular, we still nd that larger banks are more cost
eciency due to signicant negative coecient of SIZE. In both columns,
the interactions between the HHI and SIZE were found to be signicantly
positive, while the coecient for the HHI alone was signicantly negative.
This result means that, even though there are cost benets for larger banks,
a higher market concentration reduces the intensity of these benets.
To determine the bank's size in which the impact of the HHIs turns
positive, we take the rst derivative of equation (2) with respect to the HHIs
in columns [3] and [4] and equal it to zero or ( @u
@HHID = 0). The value
found is equal to 10.19 and 10.46 or U$ 26.5 million and U$ 34.9 million,
respectively. In our data, approximately 97.3% and 96% of the banks have
assets higher than these value, meaning that concentrated markets diminishes
cost eciency for the vast majority of banks. Only approximately 3% of the
Latin American smallest banks may have their cost performance increased
due to market concentration. Similarly, we can determine the value of HHID
A
and of HHID
L in which the eect of SIZE on cost ineciency turns to be
positive. Again, we have to take the rst derivative of the function, but now in
relation to SIZE, and equal it to zero. The values found for HHID
A and HHID
L
are 1.02 and 0.95, respectively. Note that the rst is not even a possible value
for the dual, and the second, despite being feasible, is still higher than any
market concentration in the data. Therefore, market concentration reduces
the eects of size on cost eciency, but this eect remains positive for all
levels of concentration.
Now, we turn to the analysis of impact of the explanatory variables on
prot eciency as in table 9. Again, columns [1] and [2] present the speci-
cation with the HHI dual in term of assets and loans, respectively, as inde-
pendent variables. The estimated coecients in both cases are found to be
insignicant. Therefore, there appears to be no eect of market concentra-
16tion on prot eciency. Regarding the other variables, we nd that equity
ratio impacts positively bank prot eciency, suggesting that the higher the
participation of the shareholders in relation to total assets, the better the
bank will feel obligated to achieve higher prots. In addition, the size of
the bank seems to reduce ineciencies in this case, as well. Loan loss pro-
vision, which is a proxy for bank risk, appear to aect negatively the bank
eciency, meaning that bank's with risk taking behavior are, ceteris paribus,
more distant from the prot frontier. Private and foreign-owned banks are,
on average, more ecient than public banks, as shown by the coecients of
the ownership dummy variables.
Columns [3] and [4] of Table 9 present the estimated coecients when we
add an interaction between the HHI and the SIZE variable. In both cases, we
nd a positive sign for this interaction, which means that the larger the bank
is, in term of assets, the worse its performance in concentrated markets. In
addition, the coecient of SIZE alone is negative, as well. The other variables
have similar results as in the rst two columns.
Again, we are interested to determine the values of SIZE in which the
impact of market concentration turns negative (in relation to ineciency) in
columns [3] and [4]. These are equal, respectively, to 12.38 and 12.33 (or
U$ 238.5 and U$ 227.1 million). In our database, approximately 69.66% and
70.69% of the banks have higher assets than these values. One may conclude
that larger banks have better prot performance, but concentrated markets
reduces this eect. In another point of view, smaller banks are less prot
ecient, but this negative eect is lower in concentrated markets. The values
found for HHID
A and HHID
L , in which the eect of SIZE on prot ineciency
turns to be positive, are 1.04 and 1.09, respectively. Note that both values
are not possible for the dual that only ranges between 0 and 1. Therefore
the eect of size on prot eciency is positive for all levels of concentration,
even though higher concentration tends to diminish it.
To sum up, the results this section presents show that market concen-
tration harms bank cost eciency, but on the other hand has no eect on
prot eciency. The coecient of bank's size is found to be signicantly
negative in all specications, suggesting that larger banks are more cost and
prot ecient. Finally, the interaction between the concentration measures
and SIZE shows that this advantage of larger banks reduces proportionally
to an increase of market concentration, even though SIZE remains positively
related to eciency for any market concentration. Due to the process of con-
solidation of Latin American nancial sector, we suppose that some banks
are increasing their size to \catch up" with others competitors, thus decreas-
ing market concentration. In fact, this hypothesis explains the decrease of
concentration in some periods and countries in Latin America. However, a
17possible reaction of the largest banks in the region is to increase size, as well,
in order to maintain their level of market power, and consequently increasing
the market concentration again.
4.3 Scale eciency scores and a brief discussion on
bank regulation
This subsection presents scale eciency scores. The main intent of calculat-
ing these scale eciencies for Latin American banks is to determine whether
these banks are close to the their optimal size. We calculate it by the sum
of the marginal costs in relation to the outputs, as in equation (4). Banks
with scale eciency greater than 1 are operating under decreasing returns of
scale and those with this score lower than 1 are under increasing returns of
scale. Table 10 presents the results of the estimated eciency scale, as well
as its evolution through time.
Place Table 10 about Here
The results show that Latin American bank scale eciency score is on
average 0.940, i.e. they are 6% short of their optimal size, meaning that Latin
American banks are close to the ecient scale. The time trend evidences a
\V" shaped behavior, since scale eciency had an decreasing trend until
2004, dropping from 0.9448 to 0.9383, and after this year, it has shown an
increasing pattern reaching 0.9412 in 2008. Scale eciency, therefore, has
not changed signicantly throughout the years.
Another conclusion we may take from these results is that most Latin
American banks might still have eciency gains if they increase their size.
In fact, only 2 banks from the total of 495 operated in decreasing returns of
scale in one year each (totalizing 2 observations). If a bank operating with
decreasing returns of scale (SE > 1) was still increasing its size, a TBTF
behavior would be congured. This is not the case for Latin American banks.
These ndings suggest that Latin American banking sectors are still under a
process of consolidation. Consequently, there is the need of further research
on the topic to determine how regulation policies aect each nancial sector
soundness and eciency.
In fact, the empirical literature on this topic has gained importance in
the last years. As proof of that, a cross-country database on bank regula-
tion and supervision was constructed and updated by Barth et al. (2001,
182006, 2008)12. Agoraki et al. (2009), for example, use this database to study
the impact of regulations on risk-taking behavior of banks from transition
economies and also if this relationship changes with bank's market power.
These authors and nd that even though capital requirements reduce risk,
they may have a opposite eect on larger banks. On the other hand, they also
nd that restricting bank's activities is eective in reducing risks of larger
banks. Pasiouras et al. (2009) also uses this database for over 600 banks from
74 countries between 2000 and 2004, and nd that regulations that enhance
market discipline and leads to a higher ocial supervisory power, increases
both prot and cost eciencies. On the other hand, harsher capital require-
ments (restriction on bank activities) increase (decrease) cost eciency, but
decrease (increase) prot eciency.
5 Final Remarks
The literature so far has given little attention in assessing for banking perfor-
mance in Latin America, especially in the revenue side. This paper is the rst
to estimate both cost and prot eciency of 495 banks from this region in the
period of 2001-2008. We employ the stochastic frontier analysis in order to
evaluate how these eciencies have changed over time and across countries.
In addition, we analyze whether market concentration has any eect on this
performance in Latin America by regressing these eciency scores on several
variables, in special an improvement of the Herndahl-Hirschman Indices in
term of assets and loans, as proxies of concentration.
The SFA model estimates a common frontier by decomposing the er-
ror term into two parts. One captures random disturbances, and the other
represents the ineciency term that represent deviations from this frontier
due to factors related to the management of costs/prots. We add country-
environment variables to control for cross-country heterogeneity of banking
markets. In the estimation of the prot frontier, we follow Bos and Koetter
(2009) and employ an negative indicator in order to deal with banks with
negative prots. Most studies add a constant to all prots equal to its mini-
mum value plus 1, which may bias the result. Mean prot eciency is likely
to be lower with our approach than with the for the rescaled prot. This way,
12This database is not available for every years. The original 2001 database comprises
regulatory environment data of 117 countries from 1998 to 2000. The 2003 database has
data on 152 countries from the end of 2002. Finally, the 2008 database has data on 142
countries for 2007. A solution found by studies that use this database and employ an
annual panel data specication (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Pasiouras et al., 2009;
Agoraki et al., 2009) is to extrapolate the information of each year available in the database
for other years, as well.
19the fact that there are banks incurring in prot losses is explicitly included
in our model.
Our nding from the SFA estimation of cost and prot eciency suggest
that Latin America banks operate in higher levels of cost eciency than of
prot eciency. Thus, the better management of costs does not necessarily
mean that the bank is achieving a desirable prot. This result is consistent
with most of the literature, and may be related to a certain level of market
collusion in the region, and also to the economic instability, which may impair
the quality of bank protability.
When we analyze the variables correlated with eciency, we only nd
evidence of an eect of market structure on cost eciency. An increase in
concentration in terms of assets and loans overall cost eciency but it does
not seem to impact prot eciency. Moreover, even though we nd a positive
inuence of bank's size on cost and prot eciency, concentrated banking
markets seems to reduce this inuence. In other words, small banks are
the most beneted due to market concentration in terms of both cost and
prot eciency, although this advantage in relation to larger banks tends
to disappear due to the size eect. One interpretation of the recent wave
of merger and acquisitions in Latin America is that banks are seeking to
improve their eciency by increasing their size as a form to \catch up" with
the size of other banks, and, thus, potentially increasing competition.
Regarding the eect of ownership on bank's performance, there are in-
dications that private and foreign banks are more cost and prot ecient
than public banks, a result consistent with the literature on developing coun-
tries. Policymakers should tackle, therefore, the relative ineciency of public
banks by, for example, providing incentives to foreign entry and private par-
ticipation to enhance eciency in Latin American banking sectors. In fact,
Tecles and Tabak (2010) and Berger et al. (2009) suggest this measure for
the Brazilian and Chinese banking sectors, respectively.
Finally, we nd that Latin American banks are close to their optimal size,
with the majority of banks operating under economies of scale. Banks do not
appear to have a trade-o between cost eciency an size. An implication is
that we do not verify TBTF behavior for Latin American banks in the period
considered, since the scale ecient level is being pursued.
A suggestion for future research is to analyze whether competition has a
similar eect, as concentration, on eciency in Latin America. There is no
consensus in the literature regarding the eects of market structure on bank
conduct (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). In fact, for Latin American banks, Yildirim
and Philippatos (2007a) have proved empirically that concentration has no
signicant eect on competition in the period from 1993 to 2000. Another
idea for future studies is to evaluate whether bank regulations, such as the
20proposed by Basel III, has a positive impact in improving bank eciency in
other economies and regions.
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68554.60 293837.28 1348217.70 1598626.38 978198.23 1557447.93 161820.94 0.0589 0.2127
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9561.74 24939.13 153429.85 271762.60 38144.78 136787.46 12835.32 0.0317 0.0193
Brazil 184158.03 1383721.70 3212066.99 4230787.31 3489475.01 5301560.42 252383.52 0.0843 1.0740
731851.39 3636440.76 9950336.39 13003616.94 9368506.64 15383537.86 781117.51 0.0747 6.5075
Chile 90182.46 405484.44 3682184.23 3558567.18 859849.56 1066382.68 80653.36 0.0376 0.0591
153608.46 586899.30 5189674.66 5022152.90 1243951.54 1611387.06 108834.72 0.0261 0.0320
Colombia 62078.35 262048.50 1404781.27 1714300.07 468297.00 644982.55 121790.33 0.0645 0.1686
109354.95 401354.04 2391685.84 2582392.73 650171.60 762195.77 180122.73 0.0416 0.8160
Costa Rica 11508.20 68401.86 323979.85 428316.20 66577.53 170969.48 12008.18 0.0564 0.1114
19836.48 118204.89 501168.51 763407.67 142670.63 374817.97 23421.70 0.0272 0.1031
Dominican 12353.95 75123.71 279828.31 373063.13 146161.14 151416.01 19124.50 0.0845 0.6803
23740.18 115846.36 507882.69 714573.76 250122.91 287854.79 40108.88 0.0628 5.3424
Ecuador 13041.59 69623.89 373267.26 566645.13 191272.57 254764.60 27136.28 0.0765 0.0343
23136.90 100774.18 563652.25 766660.16 236569.30 313829.77 37574.54 0.0415 0.0177
El Salvador 15283.14 77781.09 718620.54 773051.66 183893.87 331829.04 6742.40 0.0394 0.0425
19176.06 72228.07 731827.62 753007.20 171333.23 348176.24 7329.34 0.0196 0.0197
Jamaica 34998.42 118762.96 296351.39 613878.75 187867.75 715350.91 25518.81 0.0464 0.1982
41710.11 99916.93 282842.91 571380.58 207077.44 688144.62 27480.84 0.0198 0.2444
Mexico 174509.81 1104383.83 4967056.53 6242088.07 2308020.74 2798891.16 207099.64 0.0576 0.1816
436989.02 1668294.33 7441756.76 9761255.51 4881516.85 5637124.80 428361.36 0.0504 0.4520
Nicaragua 10046.97 32515.19 141351.61 251373.13 68429.61 173576.65 6236.45 0.0504 0.1699
7439.34 16652.47 84435.19 153211.12 38439.79 118214.51 5204.82 0.0179 0.5514
Panama 23213.02 89518.24 811844.67 950589.17 228307.68 321957.31 25876.07 0.0287 0.0467
44159.68 156322.33 1371756.23 1493163.72 369889.55 423777.10 53365.01 0.0220 0.0232
Paraguay 6223.92 114014.79 100267.59 151289.29 80380.84 57097.54 31355.51 0.1961 0.5708
9636.73 213722.71 105271.91 123692.60 54681.10 55224.53 98094.50 0.2923 0.5735
Peru 57177.65 189919.71 1323919.74 1873478.96 736072.13 738553.41 63716.28 0.0552 0.0461
94213.83 223805.33 1792065.08 2441571.93 1057179.06 932010.49 96516.98 0.0314 0.0334
Uruguay -23586.53 521197.33 223297.26 466206.97 247048.16 246280.69 35937.89 0.1326 1.3229
129540.05 1191785.34 440555.91 867367.16 527381.06 488346.94 98451.87 0.1738 1.6031
Venezuela 53322.35 191185.67 788013.79 1440600.25 567686.60 506640.92 51848.10 0.0707 0.0734
92900.89 290064.63 1435133.40 2171726.43 982622.97 686350.13 82265.06 0.0329 0.0663
Total 67455.55 459682.49 1601232.02 2041617.11 1058314.70 1525236.69 98686.42 0.0717 0.3644
348465.96 1726336.07 5198686.32 6659339.44 4446759.63 7052962.34 375055.71 0.0844 3.1008
Note: OEA = Total of Other Earning Assets; PBT = Prot Before Taxes; NII = Non-Interest Income. Standard errors
in parenthesis.
a In thousands of Dollars (USD).
26Table 2: Number of observations by year and country
ARG BOL BRA CHI COL COS DOM ECU ELS JAM MEX NIC PAN PAR PER URU VEN TOTAL
2001 27 9 58 17 31 21 10 12 9 7 27 6 35 13 10 25 28 345
2002 34 9 69 18 32 22 18 13 9 7 29 6 35 13 10 25 29 378
2003 41 10 77 19 32 24 21 14 10 7 30 7 42 13 12 25 31 415
2004 46 10 77 19 31 29 24 15 11 9 30 7 42 13 12 19 31 425
2005 48 11 75 22 25 30 24 15 10 9 30 5 29 13 12 n.a. 28 386
2006 50 9 70 23 21 30 25 16 7 9 27 n.a. 25 12 13 n.a. 27 363
2007 46 9 59 22 20 27 20 14 7 9 25 n.a. 20 11 13 n.a. 27 329
2008 46 8 50 20 18 25 17 14 7 n.a. 20 n.a. 18 11 13 n.a. 19 286
Table 3: HHI dual in term of assets by country
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Argentina 0.7918 0.8311 0.8361 0.8334 0.8361 0.8239 0.8172 0.8108
Bolivia 0.2786 0.2795 0.2610 0.2850 0.3239 0.4121 0.4329 0.4069
Brazil 0.8780 0.8957 0.8990 0.8850 0.8750 0.8894 0.8935 0.9044
Chile 0.5945 0.6897 0.6955 0.7016 0.7096 0.7044 0.6804 0.6582
Colombia 0.4153 0.4558 0.4995 0.5177 0.5334 0.5744 0.5826 0.5973
Costa Rica 0.7293 0.7362 0.7155 0.8472 0.8462 0.8467 0.8356 0.8316
Dominican Republic 0.7106 0.8015 0.8398 0.8258 0.8461 0.8436 0.8303 0.8198
Ecuador 0.7678 0.7957 0.7910 0.7720 0.7752 0.7855 0.7953 0.7898
El Salvador 0.5990 0.5947 0.5893 0.5807 0.5709 0.5598 0.5350 0.5175
Jamaicaa 0.6155 0.5559 0.5692 0.4900 0.5450 0.5370 0.4854 n.a.
Mexico 0.7672 0.7695 0.7752 0.7627 0.7291 0.7768 0.7551 0.7334
Nicaraguaa 0.2810 0.4255 0.4535 0.3012 0.2088 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Panama 0.6717 0.6954 0.7180 0.7545 0.7491 0.7786 0.7362 0.6762
Paraguaya 0.3947 0.3390 0.2980 0.2632 0.2581 0.2508 0.2475 0.2490
Peru 0.5548 0.6009 0.5880 0.6705 0.6676 0.6694 0.6510 0.6442
Uruguay 0.7328 0.8275 0.8051 0.7943 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Venezuela 0.7485 0.7442 0.7531 0.7422 0.6218 0.6168 0.6162 0.6034
a The indices were not calculated for Nicaragua in the period of 2006-2008; Uruguay, 2005-2008 and Jamaica in 2008 due
to the lack of sucient data.
27Table 4: HHI dual in term of loans by country
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Argentina 0.8145 0.8545 0.8250 0.8004 0.7983 0.7730 0.7626 0.7766
Bolivia 0.2801 0.3006 0.2924 0.3052 0.3231 0.4038 0.4223 0.3909
Brazil 0.8685 0.8854 0.8851 0.8791 0.8801 0.8937 0.8959 0.9040
Chile 0.5833 0.6801 0.6892 0.6884 0.6939 0.6907 0.6674 0.6395
Colombia 0.4123 0.4282 0.4819 0.5150 0.5523 0.6141 0.6078 0.6215
Costa Rica 0.6915 0.6843 0.6255 0.7832 0.7679 0.7698 0.7795 0.7809
Dominican Republic 0.7128 0.8043 0.8566 0.8589 0.8666 0.8591 0.8465 0.8331
Ecuador 0.7480 0.7816 0.7565 0.7835 0.8083 0.7987 0.8079 0.8007
El Salvador 0.6038 0.6078 0.5956 0.5986 0.5931 0.5873 0.5611 0.5442
Jamaicaa 0.6375 0.6780 0.6162 0.5269 0.4889 0.4325 0.4150 n.a.
Mexico 0.7663 0.7316 0.7234 0.6939 0.6644 0.6965 0.7535 0.7132
Nicaraguaa 0.1640 0.2144 0.2522 0.2617 0.1654 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Panama 0.6997 0.7369 0.7584 0.7733 0.7533 0.7877 0.7474 0.6844
Paraguay 0.3905 0.3196 0.2697 0.2716 0.3026 0.3484 0.3872 0.4020
Peru 0.5521 0.6026 0.6011 0.6307 0.6131 0.6557 0.6842 0.6814
Uruguaya 0.7856 0.8252 0.8066 0.7849 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Venezuela 0.7593 0.7745 0.7547 0.7567 0.7042 0.6706 0.7011 0.6481
a The indices were not calculated for Nicaragua in the period of 2006-2008; Uruguay, 2005-2008 and Jamaica in 2008 due
to the lack of sucient data.
28Table 5: Country-environmental variables








Argentina 5.267 0.7569 16.111 13.872 4.452 0.1118
(1.957) (0.1469) (4.445) (0.328) (7.706) (0.0122)
Bolivia 1.114 0.6757 3.382 8.276 3.867 0.109
(0.271) (0.0713) (0.7143) (0.382) (1.451) (0.0099)
Brazil 4.857 0.9312 37.599 21.690 3.588 0.0930
(2.044) (0.0302) (20.131) (0.632) (1.827) (0.0045)
Chile 6.959 1.0207 95.799 21.399 4.211 0.0831
(2.447) (0.0445) (40.283) (0.534) ( 1.274) (0.0064)
Colombia 3.103 0.8031 40.286 37.267 4.583 0.1206
(1.110) (0.0772) (19.854) (1.249) ( 2.075) (0.0061)
Costa Rica 4.932 0.7417 222.580 83.795 4.964 0.1320
(0.877) (0.0893) (69.409) (3.515) (2.697) (0.0056)
Dominican 3.538 0.786 169.727 192.583 5.290 0.1149
(0.974) (0.1696) (45.654) (6.914) ( 4.032) (0.0104)
Ecuador 2.698 0.6043 31.398 45.782 5.007 -0.1383
(0.7324) (0.0684) (11.617) (1.246) (1.796) (0.0614)
El Salvador 3.0296 0.9578 348.771 287.567 2.833 0.1113
(0.4776) (0.0927) (41.816) (2.637) (1.070) (0.0098)
Jamaica 4.012 0.477 459.538 240.972 1.779 0.1262
(0.506) (0.100) (84.359) (2.45) (0.954) (0.0166)
Mexico 8.108 0.783 97.99 52.243 2.4210 0.1073
(1.392) (0.0394) (13.60) (1.314) (1.778) (0.0179)
Nicaragua 0.7811 0.53204 13.0381 40.9562 3.9920 0.02328
(0.044) (0.120) (0.621) (0.8446) (0.884) (0.0574)
Panama 4.898 0.8153 446.427 71.895 6.372 0.1073
(1.000) (0.0830) (145.39) (2.274) (3.718) (0.0083)
Paraguay 1.474 0.6513 4.685 14.3672 3.7188 0.1146
(0.5746) (0.1233) (2.061) (0.6658) (2.133) (0.0087)
Peru 2.9653 0.7102 17.826 21.507 5.938 0.1066
(0.8395) (0.03406) (6.9458) (0.6657) (3.068) (0.0099)
Uruguay 4.545 0.4521 77.125 18.759 -0.88625 0.03201
(1.202) (0.1092) (20.8) (0.019) (5.338) (0.0656)
Venezuela 6.045 0.5174 46.30 28.894 4.869 0.1566
(2.71) (0.089) (30.388) (1.218) (9.275) (0.0403)
aIn thousands of Dollars (USD) per individual.
Source: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Latin American
central banks.
29Table 6: Mean Eciency scores



















Note: this table presents the mean eciency scores estimated by the stochas-
tic frontier model. Since there are four dierent frontier specications, only
the minimum and maximum scores estimated were presented. Standard er-
rors in parenthesis.
30Table 7: Mean eciency scores by country - Minimum and maximum values
Cost Eciency Prot Eciency
min max min max
Argentina 0.9011 0.9026 0.4662 0.4855
Bolivia 0.9266 0.9278 0.4243 0.4332
Brazil 0.9072 0.9119 0.4867 0.5202
Chile 0.9169 0.9183 0.6276 0.6374
Colombia 0.9388 0.9419 0.5668 0.5690
Costa Rica 0.9214 0.9229 0.4806 0.5003
Dominican 0.9160 0.9170 0.4683 0.4853
Ecuador 0.9307 0.9319 0.5317 0.5546
El salvador 0.9131 0.9160 0.5486 0.5501
Jamaica 0.9458 0.9486 0.5938 0.5970
Mexico 0.9131 0.9146 0.5047 0.5228
Nicaragua 0.9284 0.9344 0.6107 0.6266
Panama 0.9228 0.9238 0.5226 0.5406
Paraguay 0.9221 0.9276 0.3339 0.3726
Peru 0.9143 0.9168 0.5670 0.5746
Uruguay 0.9046 0.9057 0.3310 0.3540
Venezuela 0.9226 0.9242 0.5960 0.6072
Note: his table presents the mean eciency scores by country estimated by
the stochastic frontier model. Since there are four dierent frontier spec-
ications, only the minimum and maximum scores estimated were presented.
31Table 8: Cost Ineciency Correlates - Battese e Coelli (1995)
VARIABLES [1] [2] [3] [4]
intercept -4.709 -5.496 17.610 25.180
(2.742*) (3.102*) (9.477***) (13.309*)
EQ 7.553 7.499 7.301 7.706
(3.220**) (2.391***) (2.411***) (2.836***)
ROA -2.687 -2.554 -2.837 -2.966











L x SIZE 3.104
(1.597*)
SIZE -0.489 -0.444 -2.264 -2.960
(0.158***) (0.076***) (1.099**) (1.442**)
LLP 0.153 0.135 0.162 0.165
(0.126) (0.102) (0.113) (0.120)
Foreign -0.66 -0.66 -0.698 -0.794
(0.097***) (0.137***) (0.60) (0.60)
Private -2.93 -2.887 -2.754 -2.881
(1.217**) (0.921***) (1.409*) (1.310**)
SigmaSq 0.678 0.652 0.665 0.690
(0.306**) (0.230***) (0.273**) (0.299**)
Gamma 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.986
(0.007***) (0.005***) (0.006***) (0.006***)
ML 1849.65 1851.84 1852.21 1856.99
Note: this table presents the Battese and Coelli (1995) estimated coecients
of the cost eciency correlates. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05,* p<0.1
32Table 9: Prot Ineciency Correlates - Battese e Coelli (1995)
VARIABLES [1] [2] [3] [4]
intercept 15.618 15.490 45.761 43.604
(4.746***) (4.420***) (9.032***) (12.411***)
EQ -10.994 -10.982 -8.043 -8.775











L x SIZE 3.315
(1.122***)
SIZE -1.496 -1.494 -3.756 -3.633
(0.586**) (0.573***) (0.768***) (1.119***)
LLP 0.403 0.400 0.309 0.340
(0.207*) (0.226*) (0.150**) (0.183*)
Private -3.260 -3.262 -1.881 -2.187
(1.484**) (1.535**) (0.363***) (0.662***)
Foreign -2.122 -2.116 -1.379 -1.532
(1.001**) (1.073**) (0.442***) (0.487***)
SigmaSq 8.831 8.822 5.614 6.369
(3.957**) (3.951**) (0.656***) (2.005***)
Gamma 0.964 0.964 0.948 0.953
(0.015***) (0.015***) (0.006***) (0.014***)
ML -3960.48 -3960.48 -3944.908 -3950.255
Note: this table presents the Battese and Coelli (1995) estimated coecients
of the prot eciency correlates. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05,* p<0.1
33Table 10: Scale eciency
TOTAL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Mean 0.9405 0.9448 0.9433 0.9395 0.9383 0.9386 0.9397 0.9399 0.9412
S. Dev. 0.0157 0.0148 0.0158 0.0156 0.0172 0.0165 0.0154 0.0140 0.0144
3435 
Banco Central do Brasil 
 
 
Trabalhos para Discussão 
Os Trabalhos para Discussão do Banco Central do Brasil estão disponíveis para download no website 
http://www.bcb.gov.br/?TRABDISCLISTA 
 
Working Paper Series 





    
208 Correlação  de  default: uma investigação empírica de créditos de varejo 
no Brasil 
Antonio Carlos Magalhães da Silva, Arnildo da Silva Correa, Jaqueline 
Terra Moura Marins e Myrian Beatriz Eiras das Neves 
 
Maio/2010 
209  Produção Industrial no Brasil: uma análise de dados em tempo real 
Rafael Tiecher Cusinato, André Minella e Sabino da Silva Pôrto Júnior 
 
Maio/2010 
210  Determinants of Bank Efficiency: the case of Brazil 
Patricia Tecles and Benjamin M. Tabak 
 
May/2010 
211 Pessimistic  Foreign Investors and Turmoil in Emerging Markets: the 
case of Brazil in 2002 
Sandro C. Andrade and Emanuel Kohlscheen 
 
Aug/2010 
212  The Natural Rate of Unemployment in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela: some results and challenges 
Tito Nícias Teixeira da Silva  
 
Sep/2010 
213  Estimation of Economic Capital Concerning Operational Risk in a 
Brazilian banking industry case  
Helder Ferreira de Mendonça, Délio José Cordeiro Galvão and  
Renato Falci Villela Loures 
 
Oct/2010 
214  Do Inflation-linked Bonds Contain Information about Future Inflation? 
José Valentim Machado Vicente and Osmani Teixeira de Carvalho Guillen 
 
Oct/2010 
215  The Effects of Loan Portfolio Concentration on Brazilian Banks’ Return 
and Risk 
Benjamin M. Tabak, Dimas M. Fazio and Daniel O. Cajueiro 
Oct/2010 
    
216  Cyclical Effects of Bank Capital Buffers with Imperfect Credit Markets: 
international evidence 
A.R. Fonseca, F. González and L. Pereira da Silva 
Oct/2010 
    
217  Financial Stability and Monetary Policy – The case of Brazil 
Benjamin M. Tabak, Marcela T. Laiz and Daniel O. Cajueiro 
Oct/2010 
    
218  The Role of Interest Rates in the Brazilian Business Cycles 
Nelson F. Souza-Sobrinho 
 
Oct/2010 
219  The Brazilian Interbank Network Structure and Systemic Risk 
Edson Bastos e Santos and Rama Cont 
 
Oct/2010 36 
220  Eficiência Bancária e Inadimplência: testes de Causalidade 
Benjamin M. Tabak, Giovana L. Craveiro e Daniel O. Cajueiro 
 
Out/2010 
221  Financial Instability and Credit Constraint: evidence from the cost of 
bank financing 
Bruno S. Martins 
 
Nov/2010 
222  O Comportamento Cíclico do Capital dos Bancos Brasileiros 
R. A. Ferreira, A. C. Noronha, B. M. Tabak e D. O. Cajueiro 
 
Nov/2010 
223  Forecasting the Yield Curve with Linear Factor Models 









225  Expectativas Inflacionárias e Inflação Implícita no Mercado Brasileiro 
Flávio de Freitas Val, Claudio Henrique da Silveira Barbedo e  
Marcelo Verdini Maia 
 
Nov/2010 
226  A Macro Stress Test Model of Credit Risk for the Brazilian Banking 
Sector 
Francisco Vazquez, Benjamin M.Tabak and Marcos Souto 
 
Nov/2010 
227  Uma Nota sobre Erros de Previsão da Inflação de Curto Prazo 
Emanuel Kohlscheen  
 
Nov/2010 
228  Forecasting Brazilian Inflation Using a Large Data Set 
Francisco Marcos Rodrigues Figueiredo 
 
Dec/2010 
229  Financial Fragility in a General Equilibrium Model: the Brazilian case 
Benjamin M. Tabak, Daniel O. Cajueiro and Dimas M. Fazio 
 
Dec/2010 
230  Is Inflation Persistence Over? 
Fernando N. de Oliveira and Myrian Petrassi 
 
Dec/2010 
231  Capital Requirements and Business Cycles with Credit Market 
Imperfections 
P. R. Agénor, K. Alper and L. Pereira da Silva 
 
Jan/2011 
232  Modeling Default Probabilities: the case of Brazil 
Benjamin M. Tabak, Daniel O. Cajueiro and A. Luduvice 
 
Jan/2011 





234  Cyclical Effects of Bank Capital Requirements with Imperfect Credit 
Markets 
Pierre-Richard Agénor and Luiz A. Pereira da Silva 
 
Jan/2011 
235  Revisiting bank pricing policies in Brazil: Evidence from loan and 
deposit markets 
Leonardo S. Alencar 
 
Mar/2011 
236  Optimal costs of sovereign default 
Leonardo Pio Perez 
 
Apr/2011 37 
237  Capital Regulation, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability 
P.R. Agénor, K. Alper, and L. Pereira da Silva 
 
Apr/2011 
238  Choques não Antecipados de Política Monetária e a Estrutura a Termo 
das Taxas de Juros no Brasil 
Fernando N. de Oliveira e Leonardo Ramos 
 
Abr/2011 
239  SAMBA: Stochastic Analytical Model with a Bayesian Approach 
Marcos R. de Castro, Solange N. Gouvea, André Minella, Rafael C. Santos 
and Nelson F. Souza-Sobrinho 
 
Apr/2011 
240  Fiscal Policy in Brazil through the Lens of an Estimated DSGE Model 
Fabia A. de Carvalho and Marcos Valli 
 
Apr/2011 
241  Macro Stress Testing of Credit Risk Focused on the Tails 
Ricardo Schechtman and Wagner Piazza Gaglianone 
 
May/2011 
242 Determinantes  do  Spread Bancário Ex-Post no Mercado Brasileiro 
José Alves Dantas, Otávio Ribeiro de Medeiros e Lúcio Rodrigues Capelletto 
 
Maio/2011 
243  Economic Activity and Financial Institutional Risk: an empirical 
analysis for the Brazilian banking industry 
Helder Ferreira de Mendonça, Délio José Cordeiro Galvão and Renato Falci 
Villela Loures 
 
May/2011 
 